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Abstract. Traditionally, it was not feasible for businesses to determine the 
maximum price the buyer was willing to pay, but with the availability of big 
data and the deployment of sophisticated algorithms, with a great degree of 
precision businesses can ascertain the maximum willingness price. Some forms 
of price discrimination are prohibited under the Robinson-Patman Act of 
Antitrust (1890), provided demographic characteristics such as race and gender 
are the determining factors. The problem with this interpretation is that sellers 
are not transparent about what factors are taken into consideration when 
determining price. Current laws are either limited in their interpretation or 
inadequate to properly respond to the potential for sellers to exploit the 
consumer through discrimination. In this paper, we present a common pricing 
strategy, behavioral-based price discrimination, broadly practiced in business, 
particularly retailers. In general, price discrimination occurs when instead of a 
set price, pricing for a product is determined by what the seller knows about the 
customer. This includes historical data indicating what the customer is willing 
to pay, combined with certain personal attributes. In this scenario, the same 
product may be offered at different prices to different individuals or market 
segments. What data points are considered when designing these sophisticated 
pricing schemes remains a mystery. Using a dataset containing transactions 
collected from 2500 households, we demonstrate price discrimination 
empirically by linking consumer spending to certain demographic 
characteristics. Additionally, we address the implication of price discrimination 
to the economic welfare of the consumer, to market competition, and to 
privacy.  
1   Introduction 
In Economics, price discrimination is a pricing scheme whereby customers are 
charged different prices for the same product or service. The basis for which is the 
idea that some consumers are willing to pay more for a product or service, and under 
a dynamic pricing scheme the seller is able to extract the extra consumer surplus. 
There are three degrees [8]: in the first degree, the seller charges the buyer the 
maximum price the buyer is willing to pay. In second-degree price discrimination, 
price is determined by the quantity purchased. For example, discount offered for bulk 
purchases. Finally, in third-degree price discrimination the market is divided into 
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segments, and price is based on membership into a particular group. Before the data 
gold rush, businesses were only able to leverage the second and third forms of price 
discrimination to increase profits. Economist viewed first-degree price discrimination 
only as a theoretical frame for optimal market efficiency. Today however, with the 
amount of information about consumers that business can now access, first-degree 
price discrimination need no longer be relegated to theory: it is now possible for the 
seller to know enough about individual buyers to determine the maximum amount 
each buyer is willing to pay [1], 
[5], [6], [11].  
1.1   Big Data 
The past few decades have seen a trend toward increasing connectedness and 
engagement with technology. The trails about ourselves that we leave behind through 
our interactions with businesses and products are beneficial in that they allow for a 
more customized experience. For example, every visit or purchase made at a major 
local retailer is recorded and documented: these data are collected and stored, then 
used to construct a unique profile that is regularly updated to best reflect and predict 
individual consumer’s purchasing desires [1,2,3]. Perhaps based on purchasing 
history, moreover, certain products will be recommended or one will be sent 
marketing materials tailored to one’s unique profile based on previous purchases [2].  
A simple trip to your local brick-and-mortar retailer creates the opportunity for 
collecting a large number of data points about your purchasing habits. Your data may 
be collected from a variety of channels. Most commonly, this occurs when personal 
information (age, income level, and other personal identifiers) is provided to the 
retailer as part of the sign-up process for a loyalty or frequent-shopper card in the 
hope of saving at checkout. This information, combined with data purchased through 
third-party data brokers (Acxiom, Corelogic, Datalogix, etc.), can be used for 
personal profiling, allowing retailers to tailor marketing campaigns specifically to 
each user. Regardless the path taken, many retailers use transaction data as the basis 
for the types of coupon deals customers are offered. For example, past transactions 
(historical data) may indicate a preference for a particular brand of cereal, and what 
one is willing to pay. Rather than send random coupons for products that a given 
customer may or may not be interested in, the types of deals/discounts one is offered 
are customer-specific, tailored to perceived individual needs and consistent with 
previous habits. A company called Catalina, for example, has built a marketing 
empire providing personalized digital media solutions to the retail industry.1 When 
you are at the checkout line and are given your receipt from Catalina’s point-of-sales 
printers, a list of coupons will be printed on the back of your receipt. The product 
deals you are offered are based on real-time data points collected about you over the 
lifespan of your relationship with this particular retailer. Sending certain types of 
coupons to a market segment is an established marketing practice, and is an example 
of third-degree price discrimination (PD). In third-degree price discrimination, the 
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market is divided into segments (i.e., students, senior citizens) and the same product 
may be sold to each segment at different prices. This is a common and accepted 
practice, but what is different now is the increased leveraging of technological tools to 
collect and manipulate data for personalization of products and services.  
2   Pricing Models and Transparency 
While this may seem a win-win for both retailers interested in increasing their 
bottom-line and for consumers in getting tailored discount offers, the practice of 
collecting data on consumers and attempting to influence purchasing habits without 
explicit consent does raise certain questions. Often consumers are unaware that data is 
being collected about them and they do not know how it is being used [3]. Though the 
collection of data has significantly improved the way businesses engage with 
customers and thereby the potential for improved profit, the question of improved 
overall consumer welfare remains. 
Most retailers who use this practice maintain that only historical data (past 
transactions) are employed when designing the models that underpin the targeted 
marketing campaigns which incorporate the various coupon offers, there remains no 
way for us as the consumers to corroborate this claim. Further, if demographic 
variables are used in constructing these models, it is likely concealed.  
 
2.2   Consumer Welfare and Market Competition 
Individualized pricing schemes can be implemented in a variety of ways. If viewed 
from the perspective of market efficiency, it may seem like a good deal for consumers 
to minimize transaction time spent searching for a desired product, or to conveniently 
receive customized coupons at an agreeable price. From the retailer’s perspective, 
they can use what they know about you to tailor discount offers to you at the most 
optimal price point, which may vary from customer to customer based on a variety of 
personal factors. With such competing interests, one wonders if consumers, 
particularly those enrolled in loyalty programs, are getting the savings expected. It 
seems counterintuitive to think that businesses would forgo the ability to increase 
profits by utilizing all the tools available to them, especially big data, particularly 
when the specifics do not need to be disclosed or can be easily concealed. It is fair to 
say that those subscribed to loyalty programs may not necessarily get the lowest 
prices [1]. In this respect, the argument could be made that the consumer stands to see 
a reduction in overall financial well-being [4]. If market efficiency is contingent upon 
the empowered consumer, it is fair to say that with the ubiquitous deployment of big 
data and pricing algorithms, the power dynamic has shifted in the favor of business, 
thereby challenging the notion of market efficiency. 
Further, the convergence of the real and online environments has created for 
businesses the opportunity to merge data from various points of contact allowing for 
even more granularity in their ability to profile the consumer. Collecting more 
disparate information allows business to form a more nuanced and specific profile, 
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thereby improving product and service offering. This creates a data feedback loop 
(illustrated in Figure 1) where the more data a business has, the better the products 
and services it can offer to consumers, the more consumers they are able to attract, 
and the more data they are able to collect. This is purported to benefit the consumer 





Fig. 1. Firms collect data, use algorithms to improve products and services, overall production 
improves, attract more customer and collect more data, creating a loop, and eventually, smaller 
players can’t compete and new players cannot gain entry to markets [11]. 
2.3   Sherman Antitrust Act 
Many consumers object to the practice of price discrimination on the basis that it is a 
violation of fairness, and on the false belief that price discrimination is illegal [2]. 
Price discrimination is in fact perfectly legal: it is not generally assumed to run afoul 
of the Sherman Antitrust Law, which protects consumers from discrimination based 
on race, gender, or other sensitive demographic information. Big data has made it 
possible for sellers to cobble together enough data points about a buyer to a great 
degree of accuracy to predict the maximum they are willing to pay. If, however, the 
data points taken into consideration were among the prohibited ones listed above, then 
price discrimination would be in violation of the Robertson-Patman Act of the 
Sherman Antitrust law. According to the Robertson-Patman Act, “price 
discrimination is lawful if the prices reflect actions taken to promote loss of doing 
business or an attempt to meet competitors offering [13].” The intent of the 
Robertson-Patman Act was to protect retailers against unfavorable prices that could 
adversely impact their competitive ability. Further, the Act only applies specifically to 
commodities—goods of like grade and quality—and stipulates that sales must be 
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made through interstate commerce. This interpretation is limited, and offers 
consumers very little protection against exploitative price strategies. In general, the 
Antitrust Act seeks to stifle the formation of pricing power through anticompetitive 
conduct, rather than reducing existing power or regulating the manner of its exercise 
[1], [11]. In other words, the focus has been in protecting consumer welfare indirectly 
through promotion of market competition, but big data has enable those firms with 
data advantage in some ways to circumvent the traditional consolidation practices 
usually viewed as anti-competitive. As it is currently interpreted, the ubiquity of big 
data renders obsolete the ability of antitrust to effectively regulate market competition 
and protect consumer welfare. The only recourse left to consumers is the hope that 
companies, as they thread that fine line between profit optimization and consumer 
welfare, will forego their own economic interest and put the consumer’s first by using 
the data they collect responsibly. This is an unrealistic prospect. The current systems 
in place cannot adequately address this new era of big data. Further, there are no 
mechanisms currently in place that could make clear to consumers and the public at 
large the exact composition of the models that undergird the pricing strategies used to 
price discriminate.  
3   Our Approach 
To detect price discrimination, we look at what variables most explain or account for 
overall household spending after all discounts are applied. Without access to the 
pricing models and algorithms used to price discriminate on the household level, or in 
this case, coupon offers sent, it is very difficult to establish a causal link. To that end, 
based on the premise of consumer welfare (that is, being better off as a result of 
tailored product offerings at the best possible values),2 we take the approach that 
overall household spending is a good proxy measure for price discrimination if 
significantly influenced by demographic attributes. In this case, we define “best 
possible value” simply as a proportion of discounts received to total amount spent. If 
retailers are using the data collected for better product customization rather than to 
exploit personal markers to induce spending, we should expect to see a random 
distribution in total spending. If instead patterns begin to emerge based on certain 
demographic attributes, then we may be able to point to a systematic mechanism that 
cannot be attributed to chance alone.  
3.1  Data 
The dataset used for this analysis was obtained from Dunnhumby3, a consultancy 
company for retail and consumer data science projects. This dataset contains 
                                                          
2 Consumer welfare refers to the individual benefits derived from the consumption of goods 
and services https://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=3177.  
3 Dunnhumby Source Files, The complete journey [Online]. Available: 
https://www.dunnhumby.com/sourcefiles 
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household-level transactions collected over a two-year timespan from a group of 
2,500 households who are frequent retail shoppers. The data are dispersed amongst 
eight tables. For this analysis, we use only two of the eight tables, the demographic 
table containing 801 observations and 8 variables, and the transaction table containing 
2,500 households, 1048575 observations and 12 variables. We know that the data was 
collected over a two year time frame, but the exact time frame is not specified. 
Therefore, we cannot take into account seasonal trends and potential impact to 
spending. We instead assume that any fluctuation in spending would be observed 
across all categories. Further, demographic variables are factorized, such that 
comparisons to the general population is not possible. For example, households are 
represented with a unique ID. The composition of the household is unknown. The 
literature provided with the data indicate that the demographic information used in 
this project was captured through the retailer’s loyalty card program. Using the 
loyalty card price, we could see exactly what the customer paid at checkout once the 
discounts are applied. We used the non-loyalty card price as a baseline measure. 
Presumably the non-loyalty price is what regular customers would pay if no retailer 
discount was present, and if nothing was known about the shopper’s buying habits or 
personal information. 
Using these two datasets, we created two distinct tables: one containing 
demographic and transaction data for a group identified as loyalty card members and 
another table containing just transaction data for the remaining households. This 
group is identified as our control group (non-loyalty card members). The original 
demographic and transaction dataset contained individual observations for every 
household transaction. Since we are only concerned with total spending over this time 
period, transactions were summed per household without regard to product type. 
From there we used the household_key from the demographic table to join together 
all related transactions, establishing this as our loyalty card group. Then, we filtered 
the remaining observations as our control group, reducing the original transaction 
dataset from 1048575 observations to 1695.  
Additional trimming was performed on the final tables to eliminate outliers due to 
errors in data entry. For example, we observed in the transaction table that the mean 
number of items purchased per trip was 94, the median 1, and the range 0–83055. 
Buying 83055 items on one shopping trip seemed improbable. Looking at the top 20 
and bottom 20 observations, we could see that on average a typical basket of goods 
contained fewer than 10 items. We set the filter on the quantity variable from the 
transaction dataset to only include observations > 10. We also removed superfluous 
variables not pertinent to our analysis, such as Basket_ID, Day, Product_ID, 
Store_ID, Trans_Time and Week_No, and converted discount units to absolute 
numbers, leaving us with the following demographic variables: 
 
• Age (ordinal factors: 6 levels) 
• Income (ordinal factors: 12 levels) 
• Marriage status (factor: 3 levels) 
• Homeowner status (factor: 5 levels) 
• Household size (ordinal factors: 5 levels) 
                                                                                                                                          
 
6
SMU Data Science Review, Vol. 1 [2018], No. 1, Art. 14
https://scholar.smu.edu/datasciencereview/vol1/iss1/14
 Dependent continuous variables documenting amount spent and discounted 
included: 
 
• Retail discount (retail_disc): Total amount discounted 
• Coupon discount (coupon_disc): Amount discounted in retail coupons  
• Manufacturers coupons (coupon_match): Amount discounted through 
manufacturer coupons (i.e., paid through manufacturer promotional) 
 
Additionally, we created the following two new variables: Total, which consisted of 
quantity * sales_value to produce a single value of total amount spent per household; 
and, in order to place all observations on a common ratio scale, proportion of retail 
discount compared to total amount spent (retail_disc / total). The proportion variable 
indexes the “best possible value” a household can receive from the retailer, with a 
proportion of 0 indicating no discount, and 1 indicating 100% discount.  
 
4   Analysis 
To determine whether membership in the loyalty card program had any effect upon 
total spent, retail discount received, and proportion of discount/total, we first 
compared control and loyalty group on three variables using independent samples t-
tests. The loyalty group spent significantly more than control (see Table 1), t(1133) = 
19.73, p < .0001; also unsurprisingly, the retail discount received was also 
significantly higher in the loyalty group, t(1130) = 19.43, p < .0001. However, 
proportion of discount/total was greater in the control group, t(2054) = -3.30, p < 
.001. Comparisons are shown in Figure 2. The latter result was unexpected, and 
suggests that membership in the loyalty program does not necessarily amount to best 
possible value.   
 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of Control and Loyalty Groups for three variables of 
interest 
 Control Loyalty group 
Total $ M 1166.69 2818.82 
Total $ SD 1413.20 2160.02 
Discount $ M 154.81 360.18 
Discount $ SD 177.73 272.89 
Proportion M  .143 .135 
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Fig. 2a.Comparison of retail discount received by control and loyalty group (Note: Bars show 
median and middle quartiles) 
 
 
Fig. 2b. Comparison of discount proportion received over total by control and loyalty group 
(Note: Bars show median and middle quartiles) 
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Fig. 2c. Comparison of overall total spent by control and loyalty group (Note: Bars show 
median and middle quartiles) 
 
 
Having determined that control and loyalty groups differed on the three dependent 
variables of interest, we next explored their association with demographic factors 
within the loyalty group. Since the income variable was considered a priori to be most 
significantly associated with consumer spending and discount patterns, we examined 
the frequency distribution among the 12 original income levels on our three 
dependent variables of interest. As shown in Figure 3, the distribution of incomes was 
highly skewed towards the lower brackets. In order to simplify this factor and control 
for large differences in N between income groups in later analyses, therefore, we 
reduced the factorization to 4 levels: low (under $15 – 34K), low.mid ($35 – 49K), 
mid-high ($50 – 74K), and high ($75K +). As can be seen, the reduction led to 
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Fig. 3b. Income variable reduced to 4 levels across total spending 
 
 
In order to test for collinearity of variables before conducting an exploratory linear 
regression analysis, we first computed a correlation matrix of all pairs of continuous 
variables. Since the proportion variable was not independent (i.e., it is a composite 
index of two other variables), it was left out of the analysis. Total and retail_disc were 
strongly correlated, r(798) = .82, p < .00001. Coupon variables were correlated with 
both total and retail_disc, though at weak levels (r < .30). In initial regression models, 
then, these two variables were kept independent in order to avoid distortions due to 
collinearity. All demographic variables were entered as predictors into three 
regression models for total, retail_disc, and proportion variables. The explanatory 
10
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power for all three models was low (less than 11% variance explained in all models); 
however, all income categories showed a statistically significant association with 
total, retail_disc, and proportion. Thus, while the magnitude of the effect was small in 
absolute terms, income appeared to systematically influence the three dependent 
variables. 
To determine whether differences in spending/discounts between income groups 
were statistically significant, we next computed three one-way ANOVAs (Figure 4). 
Total amount spent varied by income, F(3, 796) = 8.13, p < .0001, η 2 = .03. Tukey 
HSD post-hoc testing revealed that the high income bracket was significantly 
different from the other three. This is logical given that many higher-income people 
have more money to spend, which may enable more expensive purchases relative to 
households with lower incomes.  
In contrast, there was no main effect of income on mean retail discount, F(3, 796) 
= 1.53, p = .21. No income group received significantly more or less discounts than 
the others: thus, while total trended upward in the high-income group, the discount 
remained flat. 
This relationship is reflected in the significant difference in proportion related to 
income, F(3, 796) = 10.7, p < .0001, η 2 = .04, with a similar post-hoc result indicating 
that high income people had significantly lower proportion of discount/total (M = .11) 
than the other brackets (M = .14). Though income explains only a small portion of the 
total variance (4%), people in the lower 75% of the income distribution received a 
greater discount benefit relative to total amount spent. Although no causation can be 
inferred from this relationship, it is nonetheless interesting that high-income people 
got a “worse deal” than the others: unlike the other groups, for whom discount given 
appeared to constrain total spent, high-income people were more likely to have a 
higher total despite hitting a ceiling on discount. This could be the result of spending 
habits among this group—they are more likely not to need the extra discount benefit 
than the other groups, and may be more inclined to spend on more expensive specialty 
items that are not offered at discounted prices. It could also be the result of steering, 
targeted discounting, and other measures aimed to nudge those of means to spend at 
full price. Further research will be required to explore this connection.  
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Fig. 4b. ANOVA of 4 level income variable showing retail discount across total spending 
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Fig. 4a. ANOVA of 4 level income variable across total spending 
 
5   Previous work 
Much of the work done on price discrimination and the issues related (privacy, ethics 
and regulation) to the practice focused on e-commerce. Though the focus of this paper 
is on the retail environment, there are still many parallels between the more static 
brick-and-mortar environment and the dynamic world of online retailers. Like 
Facebook and Google, whose main source of revenue is derived from targeted ads, 
with the use of personal information captured from loyalty card program 
memberships coupled with sophisticated point-of-sales printers1, retailers are able to 
collect data in real time, and respond to consumer demands quickly. The reality of 
which is that real and online environments are converging. 
6   Conclusion 
 
To be clear, this study is correlational only: it does not reveal a causative link between 
the demographic variable of income and retail prices paid. Particularly, considering 
the limited nature of the dataset used for this analysis, as delineated in section 3.1. We 
cannot therefore definitely say whether price discrimination was a factor in the results 
we observed. Moreover, the magnitude of the income-based difference in total spend, 
retail discount received, and proportion of discount/total was quite weak, as indicated 
in small effect sizes in the ANOVA tests and low R2 values in our exploratory linear 
regression models. However, interpreted through the lens of business analytics, if 
targeting pricing strategies were employed, such effects would need to be quite small 
and unnoticeable: indeed, it is hard to imagine that total expenditures and discounts 
13
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could be driven by income to a notable extent without consumer backlash. This is 
consistent with the literature on this issue: for example, Benjamin Shiller [10] in their 
study of the characteristics of the Netflix subscription base produced a statistically 
significant model relating subscriptions to web use that only accounted for 8 to 12% 
of variance explained. While our results cannot support any claims regarding 
demographic-based price discrimination, differences in spending as a function of 
income is nevertheless consistent with this hypothesis. It is expected that high-income 
people would spend more; however, coupled with a non-significant difference in 
discounts between the income levels, it is clear that high-income consumers received 
a lower proportional discount than others. If income was unrelated to the proportion 
of total spending that was discounted, we would expect to observe no differences on 
this variable between income groups. As stated previously, there are numerous 
plausible explanations for this result. However, price discrimination should not be 
ruled out as a possible variable. Further research is necessary to test this claim, though 
with the proprietary nature of most commercial pricing algorithms, “smoking gun” 
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A.  Appendix: Dataset Details 
 
Table 1. HH_DEMOGRAPHIC (801 HOUSEHOLDS) 
Variable Description 
Household_Key Uniquely identifies each household 
Age_Desc Estimated age range 
Maritial_Status_Code Marital Status (A-Married, B-Single, U-Unknown 
Income_Desc Household income 
Homeowner_Desc Homeowner, renter, etc. 
HH_Comp_desc Household composition 
Household_Size_Desc Size of Household up to 5+ 




Table 2. TRANSACTION_DATA (2500 HOUSEHOLDS) 
Variable Description 
Household_Key Uniquely identifies each household 
Basket_ID Uniquely identifies a purchase occassion 
Day Day when transaction occured 
Product_ID Uniquely identifies each product 
Quantity Number of the products purchased during the trip 
Sales_Value Amount of dollars retailer receives from sale 
Store_ID Identifies unique stores 
Coupon_Match_Disc Discount applied due to retailer’s match of manufacturer 
coupon 
Coupon_Disc Discount applied due to manufacturer coupon 
Retail_Disc Discount applied due to retailer’s loyalty card program 
Trans_time Time of day when the transaction occurred 
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B Appendix: Program Code 
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